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Generalized Systematic Risk
Ohad Kadan Fang Liu Suying Liu
July 2015
Abstract
We generalize the concept of “systematic risk” to a broad class of risk
measures potentially accounting for high distribution moments, downside risk,
rare disasters, as well as other risk attributes. We offer two different ap-
proaches. First is an equilibrium framework generalizing the Capital Asset
Pricing Model, two-fund separation, and the security market line. Second is
an axiomatic approach resulting in a systematic risk measure as the unique
solution to a risk allocation problem. Both approaches lead to similar results
extending the traditional beta to capture multiple dimensions of risk. The re-
sults lend themselves naturally to empirical investigation.
Risk is a complex concept. The definition of risk and its implications have long
been the subject of both academic and practical debate. This issue has gained even
more prominence during the recent financial crisis, when markets and individual
assets were hit by catastrophic events whose ex-ante probabilities were considered
negligible. Indeed, these events demonstrate that “risk” accounts for much more
than what is measured by the variance of the returns of an asset. High distribution
moments, rare disasters, and downside risk are just some of the different aspects
that may be of interest when measuring risk.
Ohad Kadan: Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box
1133, One Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO 63130 (e-mail: kadan@wustl.edu); Fang Liu: School
of Hotel Administration, Cornell University, 435C Statler Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853 (e-mail:
fl357@cornell.edu); Suying Liu: Olin Business School, Washington University in St. Louis, Cam-
pus Box 1133, One Brookings Dr., St. Louis, MO 63130 (e-mail: sliua@wustl.edu). We thank Jason
Donaldson, Phil Dybvig, Brett Green, Sergiu Hart, Steve Ross, and the referees as well as seminar
participants at UC Berkeley, Cornell University, Hebrew University, Hong Kong Polytechnic Uni-
versity, Indiana University, University of Pennsylvania, and Washington University in St. Louis for
helpful comments and suggestions.
1
In this paper we allow “risk” to take a very general form. We then revisit the
classic notion of “systematic risk,” which reflects the contribution of an asset to the
risk of a portfolio. Traditional measures of systematic risk focus on a narrow set
of risk attributes. In particular, the most well-known and widely used measure of
systematic risk is the beta of the asset, which is the slope from regressing the asset
returns on portfolio returns (Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a, b), and Mossin (1966)).
Beta is the contribution of an asset to the risk of the portfolio as measured by the
variance of its return. It sets the foundations for all risk-return analysis as part of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). However, the traditional beta ignores all
aspects of risk other than the variance, such as high distribution moments and rare
disasters.
We offer two different approaches to generalizing systematic risk. First we
study an equilibrium framework modifying the traditional CAPM to allow for a
broad set of risk attributes. The equilibrium approach allows us to extend classic
results such as the geometry of efficient portfolios, the two-fund separation theorem,
the efficiency of the market portfolio, and the security market line. Second is an
axiomatic approach in which we recast the issue as a risk allocation problem. We
then specify desirable properties of systematic risk, leading to a unique solution.
Both approaches yield similar results, generalizing the traditional beta to reflect a
variety of risk attributes.
We begin with a broad definition of what would constitute a measure of risk. We
define a risk measure as any mapping from random variables to real numbers. That
is, a risk measure is simply a summary statistic that encapsulates the randomness
using just one number. The variance (or standard deviation) is obviously the most
commonly used risk measure. However, many other risk measures have been pro-
posed and used. For example, high distribution moments can account for skewness
and tail risk, downside risk accounts for the variation in losses, and value at risk is a
popular measure of disaster risk. Recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008) and Foster
and Hart (2009) offered two appealing risk measures that account for all distribution
moments and for disaster risk.1 All of these measures fall under our wide umbrella
1See Hart (2011) for a unified treatment of these two measures and Kadan and Liu (2014) for an
analysis of the moment properties of these measures.
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of risk measures. Moreover, any linear combination of risk measures is itself a risk
measure. Thus, one can easily create measures of risk that account for a number of
dimensions of riskiness, assigning the required weight to each dimension.
Our first analysis generalizes the classic CAPM to allow for a broad set of risk
measures. The idea is simple. In the classic CAPM setting investors are assumed to
have mean-variance preferences. That is, their utility is increasing in the expected
payoff and decreasing in the variance of their payoffs. In our generalized setting
we assume that investors have mean-risk preferences, where the term “risk” stands
for a host of potential risk measures. We provide mild sufficient conditions under
which these preferences are locally consistent with expected utility in the sense of
Machina (1982).
We consider an exchange economy with a finite number of risky assets, one
risk-free asset, and a finite number of investors with mean-risk preferences. As
usual, in equilibrium each investor chooses a portfolio of assets from the set of ef-
ficient portfolios, minimizing risk for a given expected return. However, due to the
generality of the risk measure, the geometry of this set is more complicated than
in the case where risk is measured by the variance. Nevertheless, we establish suf-
ficient conditions on the risk measure under which the solution to each investor’s
problem satisfies Tobin’s (1958) two-fund separation property. That is, each in-
vestor’s optimal portfolio of assets can be presented as a linear combination of the
risk-free asset and a unique portfolio of risky assets. We demonstrate that a variety
of risk measures satisfy these sufficient conditions, where the variance is just one
special case. A consequence of two-fund separation is that the equilibrium market
portfolio lies on the efficient frontier. Using this we establish a generalization of the
classic security market line (SML) to a large class of risk measures. Specifically, in
equilibrium, the expected return of each risky asset i satisfies
E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
~zM
  rf ;
where ~zi is the risky return of asset i; ~zM is the risky return of the market portfolio,
rf is the risk-free rate, and BRi is the systematic risk of asset i given the risk measure
R. Moreover, BRi is given in closed form as the marginal contribution of asset i
to the market risk scaled by the weighted average of such marginal contributions
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across all assets in the economy.
In the special case in which R is the variance, BRi coincides with the traditional
beta. More generally, we show that our equilibrium setting is versatile enough
to allow for a variety of risk attributes such as tail risk, downside risk, and rare
disasters, among others. Our setting can also readily account for risk measures that
reflect several of these risk attributes, assigning different weights to each of them.
We illustrate that in all these cases one can readily derive closed form solutions for
the generalized betas. Typically, these betas reflect the covariation of the return of
asset i with some function of the market return. In general, these betas do not take
the form of a regression coefficient. Nevertheless, they can be estimated directly
from return data and applied in a standard Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional
analysis.
The CAPM equilibrium can be thought of as a special case of the more general
problem of risk allocation. Indeed, the CAPM beta measures the contribution of
one asset to the risk of the market portfolio. Many other problems of considerable
economic import require estimating the contribution of one asset to some specific
portfolio of assets (not necessarily the market portfolio). For example, the gov-
ernment is constantly interested in the contribution of particular banks and other
financial institutions to the total market risk (known as systemic risk). Banks and
other financial institutions may also find it useful to calculate the contribution of
different assets on their balance sheet to the total risk of the institution, so that each
asset or business unit could be “taxed” appropriately. All of these problems are
essentially risk allocation problems in which total risk should be allocated among
the constituents of a portfolio. We broaden the term “systematic risk” to designate
solutions to such problems. That is, a systematic risk measure is a vector specifying
the portion of the total portfolio risk allocated to each asset in the portfolio. The
literature has not yet presented a general solution to this problem for a broad set of
risk measures and for arbitrary portfolios.
In the second part of this paper we tackle this problem from an axiomatic point
of view. We state desirable properties of systematic risk measures, which we call
axioms, and we look for solutions that satisfy these properties. Unlike in the equi-
librium setting, here we do not need to impose almost any structure on the risk
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measure. Moreover, the portfolio of assets is arbitrary and is not limited to the
market portfolio.
We state four economically plausible axioms that systematic risk measures are
expected to satisfy. We then show that these four axioms imply a unique systematic
risk measure which applies to all risk allocation problems. This measure is given
by a scaled version of the Aumann-Shapley (1974) diagonal formula, which was
developed as a solution concept in cooperative game theory. Essentially, this for-
mula calculates for each asset the average of its marginal contributions to portfolios
along a diagonal starting from the origin and ending at the portfolio of interest. In
the common case in which the risk measure is homogeneous of some degree, the
solution becomes very simple, and it coincides with the generalized beta obtained
in the equilibrium setting above. In particular, it assigns to each asset its marginal
contribution to total portfolio risk scaled by the weighted average of marginal con-
tributions of all assets. Our proof of the axiomatization result relies on a mapping
between risk allocation problems and cost allocation problems studied in Billera
and Heath (1982).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the related literature. In
Section II we define the notion of risk measures. Section III studies the equilib-
rium setup and offers a generalization of the CAPM. In Section IV we present the
axiomatic approach. Section V concludes. Proofs of the main theorems are in Ap-
pendix A, proofs of propositions and other derivations are in Appendix B, and other
technical results are provided in an Online Appendix.
I. Related Literature
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, the paper adds to
the growing literature on high distribution moments, disaster risk, and other risk
attributes, as well as their effect on prices. Rubinstein (1973), Kraus and Litzen-
berger (1976), Jean (1971), Kane (1982), and Harvey and Siddique (2000) argue
that investors favor right-skewness of returns, and demonstrate the cross-sectional
implications of this effect. In addition, Barro (2006, 2009), Gabaix (2008, 2012),
Gourio (2012), Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012), and Wachter (2013) study the aver-
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sion of investors to tail risk and rare disasters. Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) and
Lettau, Maggiori, and Weber (2014) show that downside risk is a good explana-
tory variable for returns in both equity and currency markets. Our paper adds to
this literature by outlining a general approach to measuring systematic risk that can
capture the contribution of an asset to a range of risk dimensions such as high dis-
tribution moments, downside risk, and rare disasters. Our framework is flexible and
can account for either one risk aspect or a combination of several of them.
Our equilibrium approach follows a reduced form, where preferences are de-
scribed through the aversion to broadly defined risk. Our main results are derived
without the need to specify an exact form of the utility function. This is differ-
ent from the approach in consumption-based asset pricing models (e.g., Bansal and
Yaron (2004) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999)). These models rely on the spec-
ification of a particular utility function (such as Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences
or preferences reflecting past habits). One advantage of our approach is that it
provides a parsimonious and simple one-factor model that can capture different as-
pects of risk in a manner that may lend itself naturally to empirical investigation.
Another feature of our approach is that, unlike consumption-based models, it re-
sorts to prices directly. Thus, one can potentially test our model without relying on
consumption data.
The paper also adds to the growing literature on risk measurement. This lit-
erature dates back to Hadar and Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), and
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) who extend the notion of riskiness beyond the “vari-
ance” framework by introducing stochastic dominance rules. Artzner et al. (1999)
specify desirable properties of coherent risk measures, and Rockafellar, Uryasev,
and Zabarankin (2006a) introduce the notion of generalized deviation measures.
More recently, Aumann and Serrano (2008), Foster and Hart (2009, 2013), and Hart
(2011) have come up with appealing risk measures that generalize conventional sto-
chastic dominance rules. Notably, all the risk measures discussed in this literature
are idiosyncratic in nature. Our paper contributes to this literature by specifying a
method to calculate the systematic risk of an asset for any given risk measure. This
in turn allows us to study the fundamental risk-return trade-off associated with a
risk measure.
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Our paper also adds to the recent literature on systemic risk, which is the risk
that the entire economic system collapses. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2014) define
the CoV aR measure as the difference between the value at risk of the banking
system conditional on the distress of a particular bank and the value at risk of the
banking system given that the bank is solvent. Acharya et al. (2010) propose the
Systemic Expected Shortfall measure, which estimates the exposure of a particular
bank in terms of undercapitalization to a systemic crisis. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu
(2009) measure the systemic risk of a financial institution by the price of insurance
against financial distress. Our paper takes a general approach to the problem of
estimating the contribution of one asset to the risk of a portfolio of assets. We
provide an easy-to-calculate and intuitive measure that applies to a wide variety of
risk measures, as well as in an array of contexts.
Our paper also contributes to the literature studying conditions for two-fund
separation. The idea of two-fund separation was introduced by Tobin (1958). Since
then the literature discussed different sufficient conditions in terms of either agents’
utility (e.g., Cass and Stiglitz (1970) and Dybvig and Liu (2015)) or the distribution
of returns (e.g., Ross (1978)). Here we take a somewhat different approach, as we
specify sufficient conditions for two-fund separation in terms of properties of the
risk measure. This approach is similar to the one taken in Rockafellar, Uryasev, and
Zabarankin (2006b), who consider general deviation measures. Our restrictions on
risk measures are weaker than theirs as we do not require homogeneity. All of these
papers consider two-fund separation only and do not provide any generalization of
the notion of systematic risk, which is the focus of our paper.
Finally, the paper adds to an extensive list of studies applying the Aumann-
Shapley solution concept in different contexts, e.g., Billera, Heath, and Raanan
(1978), Samet, Tauman, and Zang (1984), Powers (2007), and Billera, Heath, and
Verrecchia (1981). Tarashev, Borio, and Tsatsaronis (2010) use the Shapley value
(Shapley (1952), a discrete version of the Aumann-Shapley solution concept) to
measure systemic risk. Our paper offers theoretical foundations for their practical
approach.
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II. Risk Measures and Their Properties
Let (
;F ; P ) be a probability space, where 
 is the state space, F is the -algebra
of events, and P () is a probability measure. As usual, a random variable is a
measurable function from 
 to the reals. In the context of investments, we typically
consider random variables representing the payoffs or the returns of financial assets.
Thus, we often refer to random variables as “investments” or “random returns.”
We generically denote random variables by ~z; which is a shorthanded notation for
~z (!) ; 8! 2 
: We restrict attention to random variables for which all moments
exist. We denote the expected value of ~z by E (~z) and its kth central moment by
mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k, where k  2:
A risk measure is simply a function that assigns to each random variable a single
number summarizing its riskiness. Formally,
Definition 1 A risk measure is a function mapping random variables to the reals.2
We generically denote risk measures by R () : The simplest and most com-
monly used risk measure is the variance (R (~z) = m2 (~z)). However, many other
risk measures have been proposed in the literature, capturing higher distribution
moments and other risk attributes. A risk measure R () is homogeneous of degree
k; if for any random return ~z and positive number  > 0;
R (~z) = kR (~z) :
A weaker requirement, which is sufficient for most of our results, is that the risk
ranking between two investments does not depend on scaling. We say that R ()
is scaling independent if for all  > 0 and any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
R (~z1) > R (~z2) implies R (~z1) > R (~z2) :
The next property of risk measures which will become useful is convexity. For-
mally, we say that a risk measure R () is convex if for any two random returns ~z1
2Strictly speaking, a risk measure is also a function of the underlying probability measure P:
However, in our analysis we fix P throughout, and yet consider different random variables. Thus,
it is convenient to think about risk measures as functions of the random variables, viewing the
probability measure as a fixed parameter.
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and ~z2; and for any  2 (0; 1) ; we have
R (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  R (~z1) + (1  )R (~z2) ;
with equality holding only when ~z1 = ~z2 with probability 1. Notice that ~z1 +
(1  ) ~z2 can be considered as the return of a portfolio that assigns weights  and
1    to ~z1 and ~z2, respectively. Then the convexity condition says that the risk
of the portfolio should not be higher than the corresponding weighted average risk
of the constituent investments. Thus, convexity of a risk measure captures the idea
that diversifying among two investments lowers the total risk.
Next we would like to formalize a property dealing with the type of assets that
are risk-free. We say that a risk measure R () has the risk-free property, if (i)
R (~z)  0 for all ~z; (ii) R (~z) = 0 if and only if P (f~z = cg) = 1 for some constant
c; and (iii) R (~z1 + ~z2) = R (~z1) whenever R (~z2) = 0. Namely, R has the risk-
free property if the only assets with zero risk are those that pay a constant amount
with probability 1, if all other assets have strictly positive risk, and if adding a zero-
risk asset does not change risk. In what follows, we often refer to assets satisfying
R (~z) = 0 as risk-free.
Risk measures can be applied to individual random variables or to portfolios of
random variables. Formally, assume there are n random variables represented by
the vector ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) : A portfolio is a vector x = (x1; :::; xn) 2 Rn; where
xi is the dollar amount invested in ~zi:3 Then, x  ez = Pni=1 xi~zi is itself a random
variable. We then say that the risk of portfolio x is simply R (x  ez) : When the
vector of random variables is unambiguous, we often abuse notation and denote
R (x) as a shorthand for R (x  ez). We say that a risk measure is smooth if for any
vector of random returns ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) and for all portfolios x = (x1; :::; xn) we
have thatR (x  ez) is continuously differentiable in xi for i = 1; :::; n:We then write
Ri (x) (or Ri (x  ez)) for the partial derivative of R () with respect to the amount
invested in the ith asset evaluated at x:4
3Throughout the paper we denote vectors using bold notation (for both numbers and random
variables).
4Note that we use subscripts to denote both elements of a vector and partial derivatives. For
example, xi is the ith element of the vector xwhileRi () is the partial derivative ofR () considered
as a function of portfolio amounts. This notation does not result in any ambiguity since the only case
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When restricting attention to homogeneous risk measures, the properties dis-
cussed above are maintained when taking convex combinations of different risk
measures with the same degree of homogeneity. Thus, we can easily create new
risk measures satisfying these properties from existing homogeneous risk measures.
That is, let s be a positive integer, let R1 () ; :::; Rs () be risk measures, and choose
 = (1; :::; s) with j > 0 8j. We can then define a new risk measure by
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
jR
j (~z) ;
where j reflects the weight assigned to the risk attribute measured by Rj . We then
have the following trivial but useful lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that each Rj is homogeneous of degree k; convex, smooth, and
satisfies the risk-free property. Then, R also satisfies all of these properties.
A. Examples of Risk Measures
Below we present some popular examples of risk measures and discuss their prop-
erties. Each of these examples highlights a different aspect of risk that may be of
interest in applications. These examples will be crucial later in the paper when we
demonstrate how to apply our main results.
Example 1 Even central moments and normalized even central moments. For
any integer k  2 even, the central momentR (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure which
is homogeneous of degree k, convex, smooth and satisfies the risk-free property.
The normalized central moment wk (~z) = (mk (~z))1=k is also a risk measure. For
example, when k = 2; wk (~z) is the standard deviation of ~z: Normalized central
moments satisfy all of the above properties as well (with homogeneity of degree
1). Indeed, homogeneity, smoothness, and the risk-free property are trivial in these
cases. Convexity stems from the following result, which shows that wk (~z) is convex,
and thus mk (~z) is a fortiori convex.
in which the subscript should be interpreted as a partial derivative is when applied to the risk measure
considered as a function of portfolio amounts.
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Proposition 1 For all k  2 even, R (~z) = wk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
Example 2 Odd central moments and normalized odd central moments. For any
integer k  3 odd, the central moment R (~z) = mk (~z) is a risk measure which
is homogeneous of degree k and smooth. Similarly, the normalized odd moments
wk (~z) are homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth. In contrast to the even central
moments, neither convexity nor the risk-free property holds in this case.5
Evidently, the feature of odd central moments that prevents them from satisfy-
ing convexity and the risk-free property is that they admit negative values. A natural
way to fix this is to focus on just one side of the distribution. The next example fol-
lows this idea, allowing one to readily incorporate aspects of odd central moments
(such as skewness) into risk measures that also satisfy convexity and the risk-free
property.
Example 3 Downside risk. When considering risk, investors sometimes restrict
attention to the lower outcomes of the distribution, in particular to those which
fall below the mean. Such an approach is called downside risk. Formally, for any
integer k  2; define the downside risk of order k of ~z as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k ;
where [t]  = min (t; 0) for t 2 R: Often, this measure is used in the special case
of k = 2. More generally, for any k  2; DRk (~z) is a risk measure which is
homogeneous of degree 1, smooth, and satisfies the risk-free property. The next
proposition establishes that this risk measure is also convex.
Proposition 2 For any k  2; DRk (~z) is a convex risk measure.
5To see the former, consider the simple example of two random returns, ~z1 and ~z2; which are
independent and have negative third central moments m3 (). Then, by independence and the homo-
geneity of central moments,
m3

1
2
~z1 +
1
2
~z2

= (
1
2
)3m3(~z1) + (
1
2
)3m3(~z2) >
1
2
m3(~z1) +
1
2
m3(~z2);
since m3(~z1) +m3(~z2) < 0. To see the latter, note that the third moment can be negative, violating
the risk-free property.
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Example 4 Value at risk. A risk measure widely used in financial risk management
is the Value at Risk (VaR), designed to capture the risk associated with rare disas-
ters. VaR measures the amount of loss not exceeded with a certain confidence level.
Formally, given some confidence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z; the VaR
measure is defined as the negative of the -quantile of ~z; i.e.,
(1) VaR(~z) =   inf fz 2 R : F (z)  g ;
where F () is the cumulative distribution function of ~z: Notice that we include the
minus sign to reflect the fact that a larger loss indicates higher risk. If ~z is con-
tinuously distributed with a density function f (), then (1) is implicitly determined
by
(2)
Z  VaR(~z)
 1
f (z) dz = :
This risk measure is homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth.6 For any risk-free return
~z with P (f~z = cg) = 1; we have VaR(~z) =  c; implying that the VaR of risk-free
assets depends on the risk-free return. Hence, the risk-free property is not satisfied.
In addition, it is not hard to find examples where convexity is violated for the VaR
measure.
Example 5 Expected shortfall and demeaned expected shortfall.7 These mea-
sures capture the average loss from disastrous events, defined as those involving a
loss larger than the VaR. Formally, assume that ~z can be represented by a density
f (). Given some confidence level  2 (0; 1), for any random return ~z the Ex-
pected Shortfall (ES) is the negative of the conditional expected value of ~z below
the -quantile. That is,
(3) ES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
zf (z) dz:
Additionally, when ~z = c (a constant) with probability 1 we set ES(~z) =  c:
Similar to VaR, ES is homogeneous of degree 1 and is smooth, but it does not satisfy
6Formally, smoothness follows if a joint density of the random returns in a portfolio exists. This
is shown using an application of the implicit function theorem to (2). We omit the proof for brevity.
7Expected shortfall is sometimes termed “conditional VaR.”
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the risk-free property. To ensure that the risk-free property is satisfied it is useful to
consider the demeaned version of ES defined as
DES(~z) =  1

Z  VaR(~z)
 1
(z   E (~z)) f (z) dz = ES(~z) + E (~z) :
Similar to ES, DES also captures the expected loss from a rare disaster. This risk
measure is also homogeneous of degree 1, smooth, and it satisfies the risk-free
property.8 Moreover, unlike VaR, both ES and DES satisfy the convexity property as
shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 For any  2 (0; 1); R (~z) = ES(~z) and R (~z) = DES(~z) are
convex.
Example 6 The Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures. Two measures
of riskiness have been proposed by Aumann and Serrano (2008, hereafter AS) and
Foster and Hart (2009, hereafter FH). These measures generalize the notion of
second-order stochastic dominance (SOSD). The AS measure RAS (~z) is given by
the unique positive solution to the implicit equation
(4) E

exp

  ~z
RAS (~z)

= 1:
The FH measure RFH (~z) is given by the unique positive solution to the implicit
equation
(5) E

log

1 +
~z
RFH (~z)

= 0:
Both these measures are homogeneous of degree 1 and smooth. These two risk
measures also satisfy the convexity property.9 By contrast, these two measures do
not satisfy the risk-free property.10
8The risk-free property follows since ES(~z) + E (~z)  0 for all significance level 0 <  < 1
with equality if and only if ~z is a constant with probability 1.
9This follows since these risk measures are subadditive and homogeneous of degree 1.
10To see this, note that for any constant c > 0, ~z + c first-order stochastically dominates ~z: Since
RAS is consistent with first-order stochastic dominance, we have that RAS (~z + c) < RAS (~z) :
A similar argument applies to RFH : Also, technically, these two risk measures are not defined for
risk-free assets.
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All of the risk measures discussed thus far are homogeneous of some degree.
However, most of our results do not require homogeneity. The next set of examples
illustrates how nonhomogeneous risk measures satisfying all of the other properties
can be constructed.
Example 7 Nonhomogeneous risk measures. Let R be a risk measure which is
homogeneous of some degree k, convex, smooth, and satisfies the risk-free property,
and let h : [0;1) ! R be a strictly increasing, strictly convex, and continuously
differentiable function. Define a new risk measure R^ by
R^ (~z) = h (R (~z))  h (0) :
It is straightforward to verify that R^ is scaling independent, convex, smooth, and
satisfies the risk-free property. However, R^ may fail to be homogeneous of any
degree. For a concrete example, set h (x) = ex, and let R (~z) = mk (~z) for k even.
Then, R^ (~z) = eR(~z)   1 is not homogeneous of any degree and yet it satisfies all of
the other properties.
III. Systematic Risk in an Equilibrium Setting
Traditionally, systematic risk is derived from the CAPM equilibrium setting. We
will now present a generalized version of this model. We first outline the setup
of the model. We then study the geometry of solutions, and present a two-fund
separation result implying the efficiency of the market portfolio. Finally, we derive
a variant of the security market line, enabling us to obtain a generalization of the
traditional beta as a measure of systematic risk.
A. Model Setup
Investors, Assets, and Timing. Assume a market with n + 1 assets f0; :::; ng :
Assets 1; :::; n are risky and pay a random amount denoted by (~y1; :::; ~yn) : Asset
0 is risk-free, paying an amount ~y0 which is equal to some constant y0 6= 0 with
probability 1. Denote ey = (~y0; :::; ~yn) : There are ` investors in the market, all of
whom agree on the parameters of the model. The choice set of each investor is
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Rn+1; where j 2 Rn+1 represents the number of shares investor j chooses in each
asset i = 0; :::; n, i.e., j is a bundle of assets. Negative numbers represent short
sales, and we impose no short-sale constraints. The initial endowment of investor
j is a nonzero ej 2 Rn+1+ : We assume that
P`
j=1 e
j
i > 0 for i = 1; :::; n. That is,
risky assets are in positive net supply. An allocation is an `-tuple A =  1; :::; `
consisting of a bundle j 2 Rn+1 for each investor. An allocation A is attainable
if
P`
j=1 
j =
P`
j=1 e
j
, that is, if it clears the market. A price system is a vector
p = (p0; :::; pn) specifying a price for each asset. Similar to the standard CAPM
setting, there are two dates. At Date 0, investors trade with each other and prices
are set. At Date 1, all random variables are realized.
Risk and Preferences. The traditional approach features investors with mean-
variance preferences, i.e., they prefer higher mean and lower variance of invest-
ments. Instead, we assume that investors have mean-risk preferences. Formally,
fix a risk measure R () : The utility that investor j = 1; :::; ` assigns to a bundle
 2 Rn+1 is given by
(6) U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) ;
where V j is continuous, strictly increasing in its first argument (expected payoff)
and strictly decreasing in its second argument (risk of payoff), and quasi-concave.
Note that U j () cannot be in general supported as a von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility. Nevertheless, in the Online Appendix we show that if V j is differentiable
and if the risk measure is a differentiable function of a finite number of moments,
then U j () is a local expected utility function in the sense of Machina (1982).
Namely, comparisons of “close by” investments are well approximated by expected
utility. These conditions apply to a wide range of risk measures representing high
distribution moments.
An implication of quasi-concavity of V j is that when plotted in the mean-risk
space, the upper contour of each indifference curve is convex. Similar to the stan-
dard mean-variance case, we will assume that a risk-free asset cannot be created
synthetically from risky assets. That is, there is no redundant risky asset: for any
 = (0; 1; :::; n) 2 Rn+1 we haveR (  ey) 6= 0 unless (1; :::; n) = (0; :::; 0) :11
11In the standard mean-variance case this condition corresponds to the variance-covariance matrix
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Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair (p;A) where p 6= 0 is a price system
and A =  1; :::; ` is an attainable allocation, such that for each j 2 f1; :::; `g ;
p j = p ej; and if  2 Rn+1 and U j () > U j  j then p  > p ej . In words,
an equilibrium is a price system and an allocation that clear the market such that
each investor optimizes subject to her budget constraint. The next theorem specifies
conditions under which an equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1 Suppose that R () is convex, smooth, and satisfies the risk-free prop-
erty. Then, an equilibrium exists.
It is well known that the CAPM setting can yield negative or zero prices (see for
example Nielsen (1992)). The reason for this is that preferences are not necessarily
monotone in the number of shares. Specifically, the expected payoff to an investor’s
bundle increases as she holds more shares of a risky asset, but so does the risk. It
may well be that at some point, the additional expected payoff gained from adding
more shares to the bundle is not sufficient to compensate for the increase in risk. If
the equilibrium happens to fall in such a region then the asset becomes undesirable,
rendering a negative price. For our following results we will need that prices are
positive for all assets. The literature has suggested several ways to guarantee such
an outcome. In the Online Appendix we provide one sufficient condition which
follows Nielsen (1992). Other (and possibly weaker) sufficient conditions may be
obtained, but are beyond the scope of this paper.
From now on we will only consider equilibria with positive prices. Given pos-
itivity of prices, naturally, each equilibrium induces a vector of random returns
~zi = ~yi=pi; and we can talk about the expected returns and the risk of the returns
in equilibrium, as in the usual CAPM setting. In particular, the equilibrium return
from the risk-free asset ~z0 is equal to some constant rf with probability 1. We now
study these returns.
of risky assets being positive-definite.
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B. A Generalized CAPM
i. Geometry of Efficient Portfolios
Let (p;A) be an equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation  1; :::; ` naturally in-
duces a portfolio for each investor j given by xj =
 
xj0; :::; x
j
n

; where xji = pi
j
i is
the amount invested in asset i; and where the vector of portfolio weights of investor
j is denoted by j and given by ji = x
j
i=
 Pn
h=0 x
j
h

: Let
j =
nX
i=0
jiE (~zi)
be the expected return obtained by investor j in equilibrium. The next theorem
shows that the standard procedure of “minimizing risk for a given expected return”
applies to the equilibrium setting. It relies on the scaling independence and convex-
ity of the risk measure.
Theorem 2 Suppose that R () is scaling independent and convex. Then, in an
equilibrium with positive prices, for all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g, j is the unique
solution to
min
2Rn+1
R (  ez)(7)
s:t:
nX
i=0
iE (~zi) = 
j:
nX
i=0
i = 1:
Given this, we can now discuss the geometry of portfolios in the -R plane
where the horizontal axis is the risk of the return of a portfolio (R) and the vertical
axis is the expected return (). The locus of portfolios minimizing risk for any given
expected return is the boundary of the portfolio opportunity set. This set is convex
in the -R plane whenever R () is a convex risk measure. This follows simply
because the expectation operator is linear, implying that the line connecting any
two portfolios in the -R plane lies to the right of the set of portfolios representing
convex combinations of these two portfolios. Figure 1 illustrates two curves. The
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Figure 1: Portfolio Opportunity Set and Efficient Frontier
solid curve depicts the opportunity set of risky assets only. The dashed curve depicts
portfolios minimizing risk for a given expected return, corresponding to Program
(7). Both of these are defining convex sets. Unlike in the special case of the standard
deviation, we do not, in general, obtain a straight line connecting the risk-free asset
and risky portfolios. We say that a portfolio is efficient if it solves Program (7) for
some j 2 R: Thus, the dashed curve in Figure 1 corresponds to the set of efficient
portfolios.
ii. Two-Fund Separation
We say that two-fund separation holds if the equilibrium optimal portfolios for all
investors can be spanned by the risk-free asset and a unique portfolio of risky assets.
That is, there exists a unique portfolio with weights P such that P0 = 0; and for
all investors j 2 f1; :::; `g ; the solution to Problem (7) is a linear combination of
P and the risk-free asset.
Theorem 3 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices. Assume that R () is
scaling independent, convex, and satisfies the risk-free property. Then, two-fund
separation holds.
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The proof is very intuitive, and we show it here. Let 1 and 2 be solutions to
Problem (7) for investors j1 6= j2, respectively, and without loss of generality as-
sume j1 = 1 and j2 = 2: The case of interest is when both 1 and 2 have nonzero
weights in some risky assets.12 By the risk-free property and by the nonredundancy
assumption, R (j  ez) > 0 for j = 1; 2: Hence, j = E (j  ez) > rf for j = 1; 2;
since otherwise j would be mean-risk dominated by the risk-free asset, and thus
would not be optimal.
Now, consider all the linear combinations of these two portfolios with the risk-
free asset. Since R () is assumed convex, the resulting curves are concave in the
-R plane as illustrated in Figure 2. Note that both1 and2 can be presented as a
linear combination of the risk-free asset and some portfolios P1 and P2 of risky
assets only (i.e., P10 = P20 = 0): To show two-fund separation we need to show
that P1 = P2 : Suppose this is not the case. Then let ^1 be a linear combination
of P2 and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^1  ez = 1: Similarly, let ^2 be a
portfolio of P1 and the risk-free asset such that E
 
^2  ez = 2: By convexity of
R (), 1 and 2 are the unique solutions to Program (7) for j = 1; 2. Hence,
(8) R  ^1  ez > R  1  ez and R  ^2  ez > R  2  ez :
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 2, the two curves must cross at least once. We will
now show that such crossings are impossible. Indeed, by scaling independence (8)
implies that for any  > 0;
R(1  ez) < R(^1  ez);
which together with risk-free property implies
R(1  ez+ (1  ) rf ) < R(^1  ez+ (1  ) rf ):
This means that all linear combinations of 1 with the risk-free asset (with positive
) lie strictly to the left of all linear combinations of ^1 with the risk-free asset. In
particular, ^2 can be obtained as a linear combination of 1 with the risk-free asset
by setting
 =
2   rf
1   rf > 0;
12If only one investor holds nonzero weights in risky assets then two-fund separation is trivial.
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Figure 2: Graphical Illustration of the Proof of Theorem 3
where the inequality follows since j > rf for j = 1; 2: But, using this  we obtain
R(^2  ez) < R(2  ez);
contradicting (8). Thus, two-fund separation must hold.
A corollary is that the unique portfolio P is efficient. Indeed, let P =
E
 
P  ez : Since in equilibrium all investors hold a linear combination of the risk-
free asset and P ; and since j = E (j  ez)  rf for all j with strict inequality for
some j; we have two cases:13 (i) all investors hold P with a nonnegative weight,
and P > rf ; or (ii) all investors hold P with a nonpositive weight, and P < rf :
But, the second case is impossible since then the market cannot clear for at least
one risky asset, which is held in positive weight in P : Thus, P > rf :
Now, assume that0 6= P solves Problem (7) for j = P : Then, R (0  ez) <
R
 
P  ez ; and so by the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3, all linear
combinations of 0 with the risk-free asset would have strictly lower risk than the
corresponding linear combinations of P with the risk-free asset. This contradicts
13If all investors choose the risk-free asset then the market for risky assets cannot clear.
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that P and the risk-free asset span all optimal portfolios. We thus have:
Corollary 1 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, the portfolio P is efficient. In
particular, it solves Problem (7) for some P > rf :
Let xMi =
P`
j=1 x
j
i be the total amount invested in asset i in equilibrium. We
call xM =
 
xM1 ; :::; x
M
n

the market portfolio (consisting of risky assets only). Let
M be the corresponding portfolio weights: By Theorem 3, in equilibrium, the
market portfolio is equal to P ; the unique portfolio of risky assets that together
with the risk-free asset spans all optimal portfolios.14 Moreover, by corollary 1, the
market portfolio is efficient, and its expected return is strictly higher than rf :
Corollary 2 Under the conditions of Theorem 3, the market portfolio is efficient.
In particular, it solves Problem (7) for some M > rf :
iii. A Generalized Security Market Line
In the traditional CAPM framework, the security market line describes the equi-
librium relation between the expected returns of individual assets and the market
expected return. Specifically, the expected return of any asset in excess of the risk-
free rate is proportional to the excess market expected return, with the coefficient
of proportionality being equal to the traditional beta. The following theorem pro-
vides sufficient conditions under which a similar relation holds for a broad set of
risk measures.
Theorem 4 Consider an equilibrium with positive prices and letM be the market
portfolio. Assume that R () is scaling independent, convex, smooth, and satisfies
the risk-free property. Then, for each asset i = 1; :::; n;
(9) E (~zi) = rf + BRi
 
E
 
M  ez  rf ;
where
(10) BRi =
Ri
 
M
Pn
h=1 
M
h Rh (
M)
:
14Note that P is of dimension n+ 1; but its first component is zero. By saying that P = M
we mean that Pi = Mi for i = 1; :::; n:
21
If R () is also homogeneous of some degree k, then (10) takes the form
BRi =
Ri
 
M

kR (M)
:
Thus, the security market line has the traditional form, with the generalized
systematic risk measure
 BRi  given as the marginal contribution of asset i to the
total risk of the market portfolio, scaled by the weighted average of marginal con-
tributions of all assets. If R is furthermore homogeneous, it is simply given by
the marginal contribution of asset i scaled by total risk multiplied by the degree of
homogeneity.
To see the intuition for this result, start with an efficient portfolio  and con-
sider borrowing one dollar at the risk-free rate and investing this dollar in asset i:
The effect of this exercise on the risk of the portfolio is (up to first-order approxi-
mation) Ri ()   R0 () ; which by the risk-free property is just Ri () : Since
 is efficient, the effect of this exercise on risk is equal to the shift in the expected
return constraint times the shadow price of the constraint, , i.e.,
(11) Ri () =  (E (zi)  rf ) :
Taking the weighted average using the portfolio weights gives
(12)
nX
i=1
iRi (
) =  (E (  ez)  rf ) :
Using (11) and (12) we obtain that for any efficient portfolio ;
Ri (
)Pn
i=1 

iRi (
)
=
E (zi)  rf
E (  ez)  rf :
Namely, in equilibrium, BRi (as given in (10)) equals the ratio of the expected excess
return of any asset i to the expected excess return of the efficient portfolio .
Finally, since M has been shown to be efficient (Corollary 2) we obtain the result.
C. Applications and Empirical Implementation
We now provide several applications to illustrate the versatility and power of The-
orem 4 and its potential empirical usefulness. We show how to use this theorem to
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generalize the traditional CAPM to account for high distribution moments, down-
side risk, rare disasters, as well as combinations thereof. We also discuss the eco-
nomic interpretation of systematic risk in these cases and explain how these results
can be implemented empirically.
i. Applications
Application I: The standard CAPM. When the risk measureR is the variance, i.e.,
R (~z) = Var (~z) ; Theorem 4 coincides with the standard CAPM (see Appendix B
for the derivation). Namely,
(13) BRi =
Cov
 
~zi;
M  ez
Var (M  ez) :
Thus, in this case systematic risk is measured as the standard regression coefficient.
The same result is obtained when R (~z) = w2 (~z) ; i.e., the standard deviation of
returns.
Application II: A CAPM reflecting aversion to tail risk. The simplest general-
ization of the standard CAPM is to the case in which investors are averse to any
moment of an even degree. That is, set R (~z) = mk (~z) = E (~z   E (~z))k ; k even.
This risk measure satisfies all of the conditions in Theorem 4 (see Example 1). In
this case the systematic risk takes the form (see Appendix B for the derivation)
(14) BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) :
That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with
the (k   1)th power of the demeaned market return. In the special case of k = 2
(variance), this reduces to (13) as expected. Another important special case is k =
4; in which R (~z) measures the tail risk of ~z: Then,
BRi =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)3
m4 (M  ez) :
Namely, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the co-kurtosis of ~zi with
the demeaned market return. Similarly, when R (~z) = wk (~z), the normalized kth
central moment, BRi again takes the form (14).
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Application III: A CAPM reflecting aversion to downside risk. AssumeR (~z) =
DRk (~z) for k  2: This risk measure satisfies all of the conditions in Theorem 4
(see Example 3). The systematic risk is then given by (see Appendix B for the
derivation)
(15) BRi = ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k :
That is, the systematic risk of asset i is proportional to the covariance of ~zi with the
(k   1)th power of the demeaned market return, censored at zero.
Application IV: A CAPM reflecting aversion to rare disasters. To account for
rare disasters we can use the demeaned expected shortfall measure, which satisfies
all the requirements in Theorem 4 (see Example 5). Assume then that R (~z) =
DES (~z) ; where 0 <  < 1 is some confidence level. The systematic risk in this
case is given by (see Appendix B for the derivation)
(16) BRi =  
E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) :
Thus, the systematic risk of asset i in this case equals (the negative of) the expected
demeaned return of asset i conditional on the market being in a disaster, scaled by
the market’s demeaned expected shortfall. An equivalent expression is
BRi =  
Cov

~zi; 1M ez VaR(M ez)
 DES(M  ez) ;
showing that systematic risk in this case is proportional to the covariance of the
asset return with an indicator equal to one when the market is in a disaster.
So far we have restricted our applications to cases in which investors are averse
to just one risk aspect. In reality, it is likely that investors are averse to several risk
attributes. Our framework allows for this by constructing risk measures that account
for several risk characteristics using Lemma 1. The next application illustrates this
point.
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Application V: A CAPM reflecting aversion to variance, downside skewness,
tail risk, and rare disasters. Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some confidence level : Here 1; :::; 4 are nonnegative weights accounting for
the degree of aversion to variance, downside skewness, tail risk, and rare disasters,
respectively.15 The case 1 = 1 and 2 = 3 = 4 = 0 corresponds to the traditional
CAPM, whereas different values of the weights allow us to reflect different levels
of aversion to the different risk attributes.
By Lemma 1 these risk measures satisfy all the conditions in Theorem 4 and
so all the CAPM results above hold. The resulting systematic risk measure ac-
counts for the contribution of asset i to all four risk attributes. It is simply given
by a weighted average of the systematic risk measures as calculated in the above
applications (see Appendix B). Namely,
(17) BRi =
R1
 
M

R (M)
BR1i +
R2
 
M

R (M)
BR2i +
R3
 
M

R (M)
BR3i +
R4
 
M

R (M)
BR4i ;
where R1 () = 1w2 () ; R2 () = 2DR3 (), R3 () = 3w4 () ; and R4 () =
4DES () ; and where BR1i ; BR2i ; BR3i ; and BR4i are given by (13)–(16).
ii. Empirical Implementation
Similar to the classic CAPM, Theorem 4 and its applications lend themselves nat-
urally to empirical investigation. The standard approach for testing and applying
the CAPM follows Fama and MacBeth (1973) and Fama and French (1992). The
first stage in their approach consists of estimating beta through time-series regres-
sions, whereas the second stage consists of cross-sectional regressions of excess
asset returns on estimated betas.
To apply this approach in our case, one needs to first take a stand on what the
risk measure R is. Then, using Theorem 4 one can estimate BRi from time-series
data. For example, ifR takes the form as in Application V above, then we need time
15Note that we are using here w2 () and w4 () (the normalized second and fourth moments)
instead of m2 () and m4 () : This is done to make sure that all of the components in R () are
homogeneous of degree 1, and so R () is homogeneous.
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series return data for asset i and for the market portfolio in order to estimateBRi from
(17). This will be a weighted average of the betas prescribed in Applications I–IV.
Note that unlike in the classic CAPM, BRi is in general not a regression coefficient.
Nevertheless, it often takes the form of some scaled covariance of the asset returns
and some function of the market returns (see Applications I–IV). Thus, BRi can still
be readily estimated from time-series return data. The cross-sectional part is then
identical in nature to that in Fama and MacBeth (1973).
It is important to note that the model does not provide us with guidance as to
what R is. Rather, for any given risk measure the model provides an expression
for the associated systematic risk. In practice we believe that the data can guide
us in finding what the “true” risk is, to which investors are averse. For example,
consider Application V, which allows the risk measure to reflect aversion to vari-
ance, downside skewness, tail risk, and disaster risk. One still has a lot of flexibility
in choosing the weights 1; :::; 4; which determine the degree of aversion to each
particular aspect of risk. The model can then allow the data to determine which set
of weights obtains the most support. This flexibility is tantamount to the freedom
provided by the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross (1976)) in which the model sug-
gests the existence of multiple systematic factors but does not provide guidance as
to what these factors are.
D. Further Discussion
Note that Theorem 4 relies on the market portfolio being efficient, and that two-fund
separation is a way to achieve this efficiency result. Our assumptions on the risk
measure are sufficient for two-fund separation, but they are by no means necessary.
Weaker conditions that guarantee two-fund separation may exist. Further, even
when two-fund separation fails, it does not necessarily mean that market efficiency
is rejected. The literature explores market efficiency from both theoretical (see, for
example, Dybvig and Ross (1982)) and empirical (see, for example, Levy and Roll
(2010)) views. Our generalized SML remains valid as long as we have evidence
that the market portfolio is mean-risk efficient.
We should also mention that the classical notion of beta and its relation to ex-
pected returns go beyond the standard CAPM setup. Specifically, as long as there is
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no arbitrage and so a stochastic discount factor exists, a beta representation of the
form
E (~zi) =  + Bi
exists (see Hansen and Richard (1987) and Cochrane (2001) Ch. 6). This does
not stand in conflict to the results in this section. Rather, our results essentially
identify a class of stochastic discount factors driven by the mean-risk preferences
being assumed.
IV. Systematic Risk as a Solution to a Risk Allocation
Problem
The equilibrium approach presented in the previous section generalizes the classic
CAPM, but it has two limitations. First, this approach allows us to calculate the con-
tribution of an asset to the risk of the market portfolio, but not to arbitrary portfolios
of risky assets. Second, to obtain the equilibrium results we imposed restrictions
on the risk measures (scaling independence, convexity, and the risk-free property).
These restrictions allow us to establish existence of equilibrium and efficiency of
the market portfolio. However, some risk measures do not satisfy these conditions.
In this section we offer an alternative approach to developing a systematic risk
measure. This approach applies to any portfolio of risky assets and to a broader
class of risk measures. For example, if a bank would like to use the VaR measure
to estimate the contributions of different assets on its balance sheet to the total
VaR of the bank, then the results in this section can be applied. Importantly, when
the risk measure is homogeneous, the two approaches lead to an identical result,
generalizing the traditional beta.
Our approach is to consider this issue as a risk allocation problem, where the
total risk of a given portfolio needs to be “fairly” allocated among its components.
We offer four axioms that describe reasonable properties of solutions to risk alloca-
tion problems. We then show that these axioms determine a unique formula for the
systematic risk of an asset, the contribution of the asset to the risk of the portfolio.
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A. Axiomatic Characterization of Systematic Risk
A risk allocation problem of order n  1 is a pair (R;x) ;whereR is a risk measure
and x 2 Rn++ is a portfolio specifying the dollar amount invested in each of n
assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) ; and R (x  ez) 6= 0. Denote the total dollar amount invested
by x =
Pn
i=1 xi. Also, let  be the vector of corresponding portfolio weights, i.e.,
i = xi=x. The only two requirements we impose on R in this section are that
R (0) = 0 (i.e., zero investment entails no risk) and that R () is smooth.
A systematic risk measure is a function mapping any risk allocation problem
of order n to a vector BR (x) =
 BR1 (x) ; :::;BRn (x) in Rn: Intuitively, one can
think of BRi (x) as the contribution of asset i to the total risk of portfolio x; which
is R (x  ez) : Note that a systematic risk measure applies to all possible pairs of risk
measures and portfolios, rather than to a given pair.
We now state four axioms specifying desirable economic properties of system-
atic risk measures. The intuition for why these axioms make sense mostly comes
from the traditional beta. Here we simply try to identify properties of beta and
ask how these properties could be generalized to arbitrary risk measures. It is im-
portant to emphasize that these axioms do not impose any restriction on the risk
measure. Rather, they impose structure on what would constitute a solution to the
risk allocation problem.
The first axiom postulates that (as for the traditional beta) the weighted average
of systematic risk values across all assets is normalized to 1.
Axiom 1 Normalization:
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1:
The sum of any two risk measures is itself a risk measure. The next axiom
requires that in such a case the systematic risk measure of the sum will be a risk-
weighted average of systematic risk based on each of the two risk components.
Axiom 2 Linearity: If R () = R1 () +R2 () ; then
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) for all i = 1; :::; n:
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When risk is measured using variance, the notion of systematic risk is closely
tied to the concepts of correlation and covariance. It is not easy to generalize these
concepts to arbitrary risk measures. However, two features can be easily general-
ized laying the foundations for the next two axioms.
First, while the concept of “correlation” is not easy to generalize, the idea of
“perfect correlation” does lend itself to a natural generalization. The intuition is
that if several assets are perfectly correlated, then essentially they can be thought
of as the same asset. Thus, a portfolio of perfectly correlated assets can be viewed
as one “big” asset. This intuition comes from the standard notion of correlation
relating to risk being measured by the variance, but it can easily be generalized to
arbitrary risk measures.
Formally, given a risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-
perfectly correlated if there exists a function g () : R 7! R and a nonzero vector
q = (q1; :::; qn) 2 Rn+, such that for any portfolio  = (1; :::; n) 2 Rn+ we have
R (  ez) = g(  q): That is, the n assets are R-perfectly correlated if the risk of
any portfolio of these assets as measured by R only depends on some linear combi-
nation of their investment amounts. In essence, this means that the n assets can be
aggregated into one “big” asset by assigning each asset a certain weight specified by
the vector q:16 Note that different risk measures correspond to different concepts of
R-perfect correlation, which typically would not coincide with the standard notion
of perfect correlation associated with the variance.17
The next axiom imposes that if the n assets areR-perfectly correlated, then their
systematic risk measures are proportional to each other.
16To see the correspondence to the standard notion of perfect correlation, consider the following
example. Assume risk is measured using variance and let ez = (~z1; ~z2; ~z3) with ~z2 = 2~z1 and
~z3 = 5~z1. Then, all three assets are perfectly correlated and for any portfolio (1; 2; 3) we have
V ar (1~z1 + 2~z2 + 3~z3) = (1 + 22 + 53)
2
V ar (~z1) :
Thus, we can set g (t) = t2 and the vector of weights is q =
p
V ar (ez1) (1; 2; 5) : More generally,
it is easy to verify that when risk is measured using variance, the concept of R-perfect correlation
coincides with the standard definition of perfect correlation.
17In the standard notion of perfect correlation, we differentiate between positive and negative
perfect correlation. We could do the same here by allowing elements of q to take negative values.
However, this is not needed for our axiomatic characterization.
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Axiom 3 Proportionality: Ifez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) areR-perfectly correlated with weights
q = (q1; :::; qn), then
(18) qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) for all i; j = 1; :::; n:
Next we turn to generalize the idea of “positive correlation.” Assume first that
risk is measured using variance. Then, if two assets are positively correlated, adding
additional units of an asset to any portfolio of the two always increases total vari-
ance. We can then rely on this feature to get a generalized notion of positive corre-
lation. Specifically, given a risk measure R; we say that assets ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are
R-positively correlated if Ri (  ez)  0 for all  2 Rn+ and for all i = 1; :::; n.
Namely, the assets are R-positively correlated if adding one more unit of an asset
to any portfolio with nonnegative weights can never reduce total risk. The key to
this definition is that for the assets to be R-perfectly correlated it is not enough
that adding one more unit of an asset would increase risk for a particular portfolio.
Rather, this property has to hold for all possible portfolios of these assets.18 The
next axiom requires that when the assets are R-positively correlated, the systematic
risk of all assets is nonnegative.
Axiom 4 Monotonicity: Ifez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) areR-positively correlated, thenBRi (x) 
0 for all i = 1; :::; n:
Our main result in this section follows. It states that Axioms 1–4 are sufficient
to pin down a unique systematic risk measure, which takes on a very simple and
intuitive form. Moreover, when the risk measure is homogeneous, the solution
coincides with the equilibrium result in Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 There exists a unique systematic risk measure satisfying Axioms 1–4.
For each risk allocation problem (R;x) of order n; it is given by
(19) BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
for i = 1; :::; n:
18It is easy to check that when risk is measured using variance, the assets are R-positively corre-
lated if and only if the correlation between any two assets is nonnegative.
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Furthermore, if R is homogeneous of some degree k; then (19) reduces to
BRi (x) =
Ri ()Pn
h=1 hRh ()
(20)
=
Ri ()
kR ()
:(21)
Thus, whenR is homogeneous (which is a common case), the systematic risk of
asset i is measured simply as the marginal contribution of asset i to the total risk of
the portfolio, scaled by the weighted average of marginal contributions of all assets.
This is identical to the result in Theorem 4 only with respect to an arbitrary port-
folio rather than the market portfolio. When the risk measure is not homogeneous,
the expression in (19) shows that systematic risk depends not only on marginal
contributions at x; but rather on marginal contributions along a diagonal between
(0; :::; 0) and x: This is a variation of the diagonal formula of Aumann and Shapley
(1974). The integral can be interpreted as an average of marginal contributions of
asset i to the risk of portfolios along the diagonal. Then, BRi (x) is simply a scaled
version of the integral where the scaling ensures that Axiom 1 is satisfied.
Note that when the risk measure is homogeneous, BRi (x) depends only on the
portfolio weights  (and not on the dollar amounts invested in each asset). Indeed,
in the homogeneous case Ri (tx1; :::; txn) is proportional to Ri (x1; :::; xn) for all
t 2 [0; 1] ; yielding the simple expression in (20). When the risk measure is not
homogeneous, the actual investment amounts (not just the weights) are necessary
for the calculation of systematic risk.
The uniqueness part of the proof of Theorem 5 is in Appendix A. It relies on
the solutions to cost allocation problems established in Billera and Heath (1982).19
In this proof we draw a one-to-one mapping between risk allocation problems and
cost allocation problems, and from systematic risk measures to solutions of cost
allocation problems. Then, we show that given these mappings, our set of axioms
is stronger than the set of conditions specified in Billera and Heath (1982). This in
turn allows us to apply their result to obtain uniqueness.
19Billera and Heath (1982) define a cost allocation problem of order n as a pair (h;x) where
h : Rn+ ! R is continuously differentiable and h (0) = 0: They interpret x as a vector of inputs and
h as a cost function. The question they ask is how to allocate total cost among the different inputs.
See Appendix I for more details on their model.
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Existence is straightforward and we show it below by demonstrating that (19)
satisfies Axioms 1–4. Suppose that BRi (x) is given by (19). Then,
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) =
nX
i=1
xi
x
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
Pn
i=1 xiRi (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
R 1
0
dR(tx1;:::;xn)
dt
dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
= 1; (since R (0) = 0)
and so Axiom 1 holds. To see Axiom 2, suppose R () = R1 () +R2 () : Then,
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
x
R 1
0 R
1
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R1(x1;:::;xn)
R1 (x1; :::; xn) +
x
R 1
0 R
2
i (tx1;:::;txn)dt
R2(x1;:::;xn)
R2 (x1; :::; xn)
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
as required. Next, for Axiom 3, suppose that ez = (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-perfectly corre-
lated. Then, there exists g () : R 7! R and a nonzero vector q 2 Rn+ such that for
all  = (1; :::; n) we have R () = g(  q). It follows that
Ri () = qig
0(  q) for all i = 1; :::; n:
Hence, for all i = 1; :::; n;
BRi (x) =
xqi
R 1
0
g0 (tx  q) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
;
which implies (18). Finally, given the definition of R-positive correlation, it is
immediate that (19) satisfies Axiom 4.
B. Applying the Result
In Section III.C we have provided several applications and shown how to calculate
systematic risk for different risk measures. All of these results apply to the approach
presented in this section as well, but now they can be used with respect to arbitrary
portfolios rather than just the market portfolio. The next example illustrates a case
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of risk measures that do not satisfy the conditions in Section III, but for which
Theorem 5 applies.
Recall the Aumann-Serrano and Foster-Hart risk measures in Example 6. These
measures are homogeneous, convex, and smooth, but they do not satisfy the risk-
free property.20 Still, Theorem 5 allows us to calculate the systematic risk associated
with these risk measures.
Using Theorem 5 and applying the implicit function theorem to (4) and (5)
yields the systematic risk of individual assets associated with the AS and FH mea-
sures relative to any portfolio weights  as follows:
BRASi () =
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

~zi
i
E
h
exp

  ez
R()

  ezi ;
and
BRFHi () =
E
h
~zi
R()+ez
i
E
h
ez
R()+ez
i :
C. Discussion
It is interesting to ask what would happen if we used (20) to define systematic risk
when R is not homogeneous (instead of using (19)). In particular, this alternative
measure only relies on the marginal contribution of asset i at  and not along the
diagonal. In the absence of homogeneity these two alternative definitions yield
different results. Thus, given Theorem 5, it must be that (20) violates at least one of
our axioms. It is straightforward to check that the axiom being violated in this case
is Axiom 2 while the other three axioms are satisfied.
20Although RAS (0) and RFH (0) are not defined, they can be approximated using a limiting
argument. Specifically, take any random return ~z satisfying E (~z) > 0 and P (f~z < 0g) > 0: Then,
for both R () = RAS () and R () = RFH () ; we can define R (0) by
R (0)  lim
t!0
R (t~z) = 0;
where the equality follows since both the AS and the FH measures are homogeneous of degree 1.
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Another alternative to measuring systematic risk might be to define
BRi () =
Ri ()
R ()
;
namely, the systematic risk of an asset is the marginal contribution of the asset to
total risk, scaled by total risk. This measure satisfies Axioms 2, 3, and 4 but it fails
Axiom 1, so it cannot be considered as a generalization of the traditional beta.
Finally, it is worth noting that (20) can also be written as
BRi () =
d
dt

t=0
R (+t"i)
d
dt

t=0
R (+t)
;
where "i is an n-dimensional vector equal to 1 at the ith dimension and zero else-
where. Namely, when the risk measure is homogeneous, systematic risk of asset i
can be thought of as the directional derivative of total risk along the ith dimension
scaled by the derivative along the diagonal in the direction of the portfolio itself.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we generalize the concept of systematic risk to account for a variety
of risk characteristics. Our equilibrium approach shows that results attributed to the
classic CAPM hold much more broadly. In particular, aspects of the geometry of
efficient portfolios, two-fund separation, and the security market line are derived in
a setting where risk can account for a variety of attributes. Our axiomatic approach
specifies four economically meaningful conditions that pin down a unique measure
of systematic risk. Both approaches lead to similar generalizations of the traditional
beta.
When risk is confined to measure the variance of a distribution, our systematic
risk measures coincide with the traditional beta, the slope from regressing asset re-
turns on portfolio returns. More generally, systematic risk is not a regression coeffi-
cient. Our equilibrium setting leads to the conclusion that systematic risk is simply
the marginal contribution of the asset to the risk of the portfolio of interest, scaled
by the weighted average of all such marginal contributions. An identical result is
obtained in the axiomatic approach for homogeneous risk measures. When the risk
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measure is not homogeneous, the axiomatic approach gives rise to an expression
for systematic risk that involves averaging marginal contributions of the asset along
a diagonal from the origin to the portfolio of interest.
Our axiomatic approach applies to a wide variety of risk measures, requiring of
them only smoothness and zero risk for zero investment. The equilibrium frame-
work imposes additional conditions in the form of scaling independence, convexity,
and the risk-free property. Nevertheless, even in the equilibrium framework we are
still left with an extensive class of risk measures. Indeed, this class is sufficiently
broad to potentially account for high distribution moments, downside risk, rare dis-
asters, and other aspects of risk. A limitation of our framework is that we restrict
all investors to use the same risk measure. Future research may direct at develop-
ing weaker conditions on the risk measures and introducing more heterogeneity to
investor risk preferences.
Finally, our approach is agnostic regarding the choice of a particular risk mea-
sure. Indeed, which risk measures better capture the risk preferences of investors
is ultimately an empirical question. Our framework therefore provides foundations
for testing the appropriateness of risk measures and consequently selecting those
that are supported by the data.
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Appendix A: Proofs of Main Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: Our setting is a special case of the setting in Nielsen (1989).
To show the existence of equilibrium Nielsen requires that preferences satisfy the
following three conditions: (i) each investor’s choice set is closed and convex, and
contains her initial endowment; (ii) The set of f 2 Rn+1 : U j ()  U j ( 0)g is
closed for all  0 2 Rn+1 and for all j = f1; :::; `g; (iii) If ;  0 2 Rn+1 and
U j ( 0) > U j () ; then U j(t 0 + (1  t)) > U j() for all t in (0; 1).
Condition (i) is satisfied in our setting since the choice set of each investor is
Rn+1, which is closed and convex, and contains ej for all j. Condition (ii) holds
since V is assumed continuous and R is assumed smooth, and so their composition
is continuous. Condition (iii) follows since V () is quasi-concave, strictly increas-
ing in its first argument and strictly decreasing in its second argument, and R () is
a convex risk measure.
Given these properties of the preferences, Nielsen (1989) establishes two con-
ditions as sufficient for the existence of a quasi-equilibrium: (i) positive semiinde-
pendence of directions of improvement, and (ii) nonsatiation at Pareto attainable
portfolios. Condition (i) follows in our setting as in Nielsen (1990, Proposition 1)
since in our setting all investors agree on all parameters of the problem (in particular
on the expected returns), and due to the nonredundancy of risky assets assumption.
To see why condition (ii) holds in our setting note that we assume the existence of
a risk-free asset paying a nonzero payoff with probability 1. Since R () satisfies
the risk-free property, we have that R (~z1 + ~z2)  R (~z1) whenever ~z2 is risk-free
with P (f~z2 > 0g) = 1. Thus, adding a positive risk-free asset can only (weakly)
reduce risk. It follows that we can always add this positive risk-free asset to any
bundle , strictly increasing the expected return while weakly decreasing risk. This
implies that in our model there is no satiation globally. Thus, a quasi-equilibrium
exists in our setting. Moreover, any quasi-equilibrium is, in fact, an equilibrium
in our setting. This follows from the conditions in Nielsen (1989 p. 469). In-
deed, in our setting each investor’s choice set is convex and unbounded, and the set
f 2 Rn+1 : U j () > U j ( 0)g is open for all j and  0 2 Rn+1:
Proof of Theorem 2: Suppose that the equilibrium bundle of investor j is j: Let
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xj =
Pn
i=0 x
j
i = p  j be the total dollar amount of investment of investor j: Then,
U j
 
j

= V j
 
E
 
nX
i=0
ji ~yi
!
; R
 
nX
i=0
ji ~yi
!!
(A1)
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nX
i=0
xji
xj
~zi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
nX
i=0
ji ~zi
!
; R
 
xj
nX
i=0
ji ~zi
!!
= V j
 
xjE
 
j  ez ; R  xj  j  ez :
From the definition of equilibrium, each investor chooses j to maximize U j
 
j

subject to xj  p  ej; where by the positivity of prices xj = p  ej > 0 (using that
ej 2 Rn+1+ is not zero by assumption). From (A1) and since V j is strictly increasing
in the first argument and strictly decreasing in the second argument, we have that
for any positive xj; U j
 
j

is strictly increasing in E (j  ez) and strictly decreas-
ing in R (xj (j  ez)) : Therefore, in equilibrium, j must minimize R (xj (  ez))
for a given level of expected return E (j  ez) : By scaling independence, this is
equivalent to minimizing R (  ez) for a given level of expected return, and thus, to
solving Problem (7). The solution is unique since we assumed thatR () is a convex
risk measure, and so R (  ez) is convex as a function of :
Proof of Theorem 4: By the smoothness ofR () and by Theorem 1, the solution to
Problem (7) for some j =  is determined by the first order conditions. To solve
this program, form the Lagrangian
L () = R ()  
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
;
where  is a Lagrange multiplier. Equivalently,
L () = R
 
1 
nX
i=1
i; 1; :::; n
!
 
 
nX
i=1
iE (~zi) +
 
1 
nX
i=1
i
!
rf   
!
:
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The first order condition states that for all i = 1; :::; n;
(A2)  R0 () +Ri ()   (E (~zi)  rf ) = 0;
where  is any efficient portfolio (the market portfolio being a special case). By
the risk-free property, R0 () = 0: Hence,
(A3) Ri () =  (E (~zi)  rf ) :
It follows that
nX
i=1
iRi (
) = 
nX
i=1
i (E (~zi)  rf )(A4)
=  (E (ez )  rf ) :
From (A3) and (A4) we obtain
Ri (
)Pn
h=1 

hRh (
)
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf ;
as required. If R is homogeneous of degree k, then by Euler’s homogeneous func-
tion theorem and using the risk-free property this is also equivalent to
Ri (
)
kR ()
=
E (~zi)  rf
E (ez )  rf :
Proof of Theorem 5: The proof relies on a mapping between risk allocation prob-
lems as defined in Section IV.A and cost allocation problems as defined in Billera
and Heath (1982, hereafter BH). Specifically, BH define a cost allocation problem
of order n as a pair (h;x) where h : Rn+ ! R is continuously differentiable and
h (0) = 0: Since R is smooth and satisfies R (0) = 0 we can view any risk alloca-
tion problem, (R;x) ; of order n; as a cost allocation problem as defined in BH by
setting h (x) = R (x  ez) : Given this mapping we will use (R;x) to denote both the
risk allocation problem and its corresponding cost allocation problem. BH define
a cost allocation procedure as a function assigning each cost allocation problem
(R;x) of order n a vector c (R;x) 2 Rn: That is, c (R;x) should be interpreted as
the cost allocated to each of the n goods or services.
38
We can then consider a natural mapping between systematic risk measures as
defined in Section IV.A and the BH cost allocation procedures as follows. IfBR (x)
is a systematic risk measure of the risk allocation problem (R;x) ; then
(A5) c (R;x) = B
R (x)R (x  ez)
x
is a cost allocation procedure for the corresponding cost allocation problem (R;x) :
Namely, risk allocation measures can be viewed as scaled versions of cost allocation
procedures for the corresponding problems.
Lemma A1 If a systematic risk measureBR (x) satisfies Axioms 1-4, then the cor-
responding cost allocation procedure c (R;x) satisfies Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in
BH.
It is important to note that Axioms 1-4 and Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH are not
equivalent to each other either as a group or individually. Rather, our four axioms
as a set are stronger than their four conditions as a set. The proof of this lemma
follows from the next four steps.
Step 1. Axiom 1 is satisfied if and only if Condition (2.1) in BH holds. Indeed,Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1 is equivalent to
Pn
i=1
 
xiR (x)BRi (x) =x

= R (x) ; which
using (A5) is equivalent toPni=1 xici (R;x) = R (x) : This is Condition (2.1).
Step 2. Axiom 2 is satisfied if and only if Condition (2.2) in BH holds. Indeed,
suppose R () = R1 () +R2 () and
BRi (x) =
R1 (x)
R (x)
BR1i (x) +
R2 (x)
R (x)
BR2i (x) :
Then
BRi (x)R (x)
x
=
R1 (x)BR1i (x)
x
+
R2 (x)BR2i (x)
x
:
That is,
ci (R;x) = ci
 
R1;x

+ ci
 
R2;x

;
which is Condition (2.2).
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Step 3. Axioms 1 and 3 jointly imply Condition (2.3).
Assume that both Axioms 1 and 3 are satisfied and assume that for all  2 Rn+;
(A6) R (  ez) = g (  q)
for some function g () and a nonzero vector q 2 Rn+: Then, (~z1; :::; ~zn) are R-
perfectly correlated.
By Axiom 3 for all i; j = 1; :::; n;
(A7) qjBRi (x) = qiBRj (x) ;
and hence
iqjBRi (x) = iqiBRj (x) :
Summing over i = 1; :::; n gives
(A8) qj
nX
i=1
iBRi (x) = (  q)BRj (x) :
By Axiom 1 we know that
Pn
i=1 iBRi (x) = 1: Plugging this into (A8) we have
qj = (  q)BRj (x) for j = 1; :::; n:
By (A5), and recalling that R (x) 6= 0;
(A9) qj = (  q) cj (R;x) x
R (x)
= (x  q) cj (R;x)
R (x)
for j = 1; :::; n:
If x q = 0 this implies that qj = 0 for all j; contradicting that q is a nonzero vector.
Hence, x  q is not zero. We then have
(A10) cj (R;x) = qjR (x)
(x  q) for all j = 1; ::; n:
Consider an asset with return ~w = (x  ez) = (x  q) : Namely, investing x  q
dollars in this asset yields the same return as of the portfolio x: Then,
R ((x  q) ~w) = R (x  ez) = g (x  q) :
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Consider now the risk allocation problem of order 1 with the single asset ~w held at
the amount x q: By Axiom 1 the systematic risk measure of this asset must satisfy
BR (x  q) = 1;
or equivalently using (A5),
c (g;x  q) = R ((x  q) ~w)
x  q =
g (x  q)
x  q :
Plugging back into (A10) and using that R (x) = g (x  q) we have
cj (R;x) = c (g;x  q) qj:
This is exactly what Condition (2.3) in BH requires, restricting attention to the case
that q is a nonzero vector of nonnegative integers.
Step 4. Axiom 4 is satisfied if and only if Condition (2.4) holds. This follows
directly from (A5) and the definition of R-positive correlation.
Having established Lemma A1 we now turn to completing the proof of the the-
orem. First, existence has been proved in the text by showing that (19) satisfies
Axioms 1-4. To show uniqueness note that Lemma A1 implies that Axioms 1-4
are jointly stronger than Conditions (2.1)-(2.4) in BH. From BH’s main result we
know that there is a unique cost allocation procedure c (R;x) satisfying Conditions
(2.1)-(2.4). It follows (using the mapping (A5)) that there is a unique systematic
risk measure satisfying Axioms 1-4. Thus, the unique systematic risk measure is
given by (19).
Finally, to see that (19) and (20) are equivalent when R is homogeneous of
degree k; note first that in this caseZ 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt = Ri (x1; :::; xn)
Z 1
0
tk 1dt
=
Ri (x1; :::; xn)
k
;
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where the first equality follows since Ri is homogeneous of degree k 1: It follows
that
BRi (x) =
x
R 1
0
Ri (tx1; :::; txn) dt
R (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
xRi (x1; :::; xn)
kR (x1; :::; xn)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)
kR (1; :::; n)
=
Ri (1; :::; n)Pn
h=1 hRh (1; :::; n)
;
where the penultimate equality follows from the homogeneity of degrees k and k 1
of R and Ri respectively, and the last equality follows from Euler’s homogeneous
function theorem. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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Appendix B: Other Proofs and Derivations
Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1: We need to show that for any random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
and any 0 <  < 1,
(A11) wk (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  wk (~z1) + (1  )wk (~z2) :
Letting z^1 = ~z1   E (~z1) and z^2 = ~z2   E (~z2) ; (A11) can be rewritten as
(A12)

E
h
(z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
i 1
k    E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k :
Applying the binomial formula to the LHS of (A12) implies that we need to
show 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
   E z^k1 1k + (1  )  E z^k2 1k :
Since k is even, replacing each z^1 and z^2 with jz^1j and jz^2j will not affect the RHS,
but it might increase the LHS. So, it is sufficient to show that 
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2
! 1
k
 

E
h
jz^1jk
i 1
k
+(1  )

E
h
jz^2jk
i 1
k
:
Since both sides are positive we can raise both sides to the kth power, maintaining
the inequality. Thus, it would be sufficient to show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki 1k + (1  )E hjz^2jki 1kk :
Applying the binomial formula to the RHS implies that it would be sufficient to
show
kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i E  z^k i1 z^i2  kX
i=0

k
i

k i (1  )i

E
h
jz^1jk
i k i
k

E
h
jz^2jk
i i
k
:
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To establish this inequality we will show that it actually holds term by term.
That is, it is sufficient to show that for each i = 0; :::; k;
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hjz^1jki k ik E hjz^2jki ik :
To see this, note that it is equivalent to show that
E
 z^k i1 z^i2  E hz^k i1  kk ii k ik E hz^i2 ki i ik :
But, this is immediate from Hölder’s inequality, and we are done.
Proof of Proposition 2: For any integer k  2; we can rewrite the downside risk
measure as
DRk (~z) = ( 1)k

E
 
[~z   E (~z)] k 1k = E  [E (~z)  ~z]+k 1k ;
where [t]+ = max (t; 0) for t 2 R:
Consider any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2; and let z^1 = [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ and
z^2 = [E (~z2)  ~z2]+ : Obviously, we have z^1  0 and z^2  0: What we need to
show is that for any 0 <  < 1,
E
 
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+
k 1k    E  z^k1 1k+(1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
Now,
[E (~z1 + (1  ) ~z2)  ~z1   (1  ) ~z2]+ = [ (E (~z1)  ~z1) + (1  ) (E (~z2)  ~z2)]+
  [E (~z1)  ~z1]+ + (1  ) [E (~z2)  ~z2]+
= z^1 + (1  ) z^2;
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality using that []+ is a convex
function.
Therefore, it is sufficient to show that
E (z^1 + (1  ) z^2)k
 1
k    E  z^k1 1k + (1  )  E  z^k2 1k :
The rest of the proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 1. Indeed, since z^1
and z^2 are nonnegative here, the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1 apply in
this case to any positive k (odd or even).
44
Proof of Proposition 3: In the definition of expected shortfall we assumed the ex-
istence of a cumulative distribution function F () applied to realizations of random
variables. For the sake of this proof it will be more useful to work directly with the
state space 
 and with the underlying probability measure P () :We first prove that
ES(~z) is subadditive. That is, for any two random returns ~z1 and ~z2;
(A13) ES(~z1 + ~z2)  ES(~z1) + ES(~z2):
If either ~z1 or ~z2 is equal to a constant with probability 1, then the result is imme-
diate. We shall thus only consider the case in which both of them are not equal to
a constant. By (3), for any random return ~z (which is not constant), ES (~z) can be
expressed as
ES (~z) =  1

Z
f!:~z VaR(~z)g
~zdP (!) :
Let ~z1 and ~z2 be random returns and define ~z3 = ~z1+~z2: Let 
i = f! 2 
 : ~zi   VaR (~zi)g
for i = 1; 2; 3: Then, (A13) is equivalent toZ

3
~z3dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) ;
which can be rewritten asZ

3
~z1dP (!) +
Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) +
Z

2
~z2dP (!) :
It is sufficient to show that
(A14)
Z

3
~z1dP (!) 
Z

1
~z1dP (!) ;
and
(A15)
Z

3
~z2dP (!) 
Z

2
~z2dP (!) :
For brevity, we will only prove (A14). The proof of (A15) is parallel.
Define

4 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g ;

5 = f! 2 
 : ~z1   VaR (~z1) ; ~z3 >  VaR (~z3)g ; and

6 = f! 2 
 : ~z1 >  VaR (~z1) ; ~z3   VaR (~z3)g :
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Clearly, 
4 \ 
5 = ?; 
4 [ 
5 = 
1; 
4 \ 
6 = ?; and 
4 [ 
6 = 
3: Thus,Z

1
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

5
dP (!) ;
and Z

3
dP (!) =
Z

4
dP (!) +
Z

6
dP (!) :
By the definition of VaR, we knowZ

1
dP (!) =
Z

3
dP (!) = :
Thus, we obtain
(A16)
Z

5
dP (!) =
Z

6
dP (!) :
Similarly, we haveZ

1
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

5
~z1dP (!) ;
and Z

3
~z1dP (!) =
Z

4
~z1dP (!) +
Z

6
~z1dP (!) :
Hence, Z

1
~z1dP (!) 
Z

3
~z1dP (!)
=
Z

5
~z1dP (!) 
Z

6
~z1dP (!)

Z

5
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!) 
Z

6
[ VaR (~z1)] dP (!)
=  VaR (~z1)
Z

5
dP (!) 
Z

6
dP (!)

= 0;
where the inequality follows from ~z1   VaR (~z1) when ! 2 
5 and ~z1 >
 VaR (~z1) when ! 2 
6; and where the last equality follows from (A16). There-
fore, (A14) is obtained, and hence ES(~z) is subadditive. Since DES(~z) = ES(~z)+
E(~z) we have that DES is also subadditive.
Convexity now follows immediately from homogeneity of degree 1 and subad-
ditivity.
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Derivations of Systematic Risk for Applications I–V
Here we provide derivations of the systematic risk associated with different risk
measures discussed in Section III.C.
Application I: This is a special case of Application II.
Application II: Consider the risk measure R (~z) = mk (~z) for even k  2: The risk
of the market portfolio is
R
 
M  ez = mk  M  ez = E  M  ez  E  M  ezk :
Differentiating with respect to the weight of asset i yields
@mk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= kE
h
(~zi   E (~zi))
 
M  ez  E  M  ezk 1i
= kCov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1 :
By Theorem 4, and since mk () is homogeneous of degree k; the systematic risk is
then given by
(A17) BRi =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) =
Cov

~zi;

M  ez M  E (ez)k 1
mk (M  ez) ;
as required.
Now suppose alternatively that R (~z) = wk (~z) : The market portfolio risk is
R
 
M  ez = wk  M  ez =  mk  M  ez 1k :
Differentiating with respect to the weight of asset i gives
@wk
 
M  ez
@Mi
=
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk  M  ez
@Mi
:
By Theorem 4, and since wk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk is
BRi =
1
k
 
mk
 
M  ez 1k 1 @mk(M ez)
@Mi
(mk (M  ez)) 1k =
@mk(M ez)
@Mi
kmk (M  ez) ;
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which is identical to (A17).
Application III: Assume R (~z) = DRk (~z) for k  2: The risk of the market
portfolio M is given by
DRk
 
M  ez = ( 1)k EM  ez  E  M  ez k 1k :
Differentiating with respect to Mi gives21
@DRk
 
M  ez
@Mi
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1 E (~zi   E (~zi))M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
= ( 1)k

E

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1k 1 Cov ~zi;M  ez  E  M  ez k 1 :
By Theorem 4, and since DRk () is homogeneous of degree 1, the systematic risk
is given by
BRi =
@DRk(M ez)
@Mi
DRk (M  ez)
=
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
E
 
[M  ez  E (M  ez)] k
= ( 1)k
Cov

~zi;

M  ez  E  M  ez k 1
(DRk (M  ez))k :
Application IV: Assume R (~z) = DES (~z) for some confidence level 0 <  < 1:
Let f(z1; :::; zn) denote the joint density function of ez: Since all risky assets have
21Note that we are essentially relying here on Leibniz’s rule for differentiation under the integral.
While

M  z  E  M  ez k is not everywhere differentiable, it is continuous and differen-
tiable almost everywhere. This guarantees that Leibniz’s rule applies.
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positive net supply and since asset prices are positive, we have M1 > 0: Hence, the
risk of the market portfolio M can be written as follows
DES(
M  ez)
= ES(
M  ez) + E  M  ez
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
 
nX
j=1
Mj zj   E
 
M  ez! f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn:
Differentiating DES(M  ez) using Leibniz’s rule with respect to Mi yields
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
(A18)
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
+
VaR(
M  ez) + E  M  ez

 @
@Mi
0@Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
1A :
Notice that by the definition of VaR(M  ez);Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn = ;
which is a constant, implying that the second term in (A18) is zero. Thus,
@DES(
M  ez)
@Mi
=  1

Z +1
 1
:::
Z +1
 1
Z  VaR(M ez) Pnj=2 Mj zj
M1
 1
(zi   E (~zi)) f(z1; :::; zn)dz1:::dzn
=  1

E

1M ez VaR(M ez) (zi   E (~zi))
=  E ~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez) :
By Theorem 4, and since DES(M  ez) is homogeneous of degree 1, the sys-
tematic risk is given by
BRi =
@DES(
M ez)
@Mi
DES(M  ez) =  E

~zi   E (~zi) jM  ez   VaR(M  ez)
DES(M  ez) :
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Application V: Consider the following family of risk measures
R (~z) = 1w2 (~z) + 2DR3 (~z) + 3w4 (~z) + 4DES (~z)
for some confidence level  and nonnegative weights 1; :::; 4. From Lemma 1, this
family of risk measures satisfies all of the conditions in Theorem 4. Moreover, it is
easy to verify that when
R (~z) =
sX
j=1
Rj (~z) ;
the expression for BRi given in (10) implies
BRi =
sX
j=1
Rj
 
M  ez
R (M  ez) BRji :
That is, the systematic risk takes the form of the risk-weighted average of the sys-
tematic risk associated with each of the risk components. (See also Section IV.A
for further discussion of this issue as it relates to Axiom 2 in that section.)
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Online Appendix
Mean-Risk Preferences and Expected Utility
Background
One would wonder how the mean-risk preferences considered in Section III are
related to the commonly assumed von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. It is widely
known that a von Neumann-Morgenstern investor with a quadratic utility function
only cares about the mean and the variance of his investments in the sense that he
prefers a high expected wealth and a low variance. In this sense, the mean-risk
preference is consistent with the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility when variance
is used as the risk measure. Alternatively, when returns are distributed according to
a two-parameter elliptical distribution (normal being a special case), mean-variance
preferences can also be supported by expected utility. These instances, however,
are quite restrictive. First, the quadratic utility is not very intuitive since it implies
increasing absolute risk aversion. Second, elliptical distributions, being determined
by the first two moments only, limit our ability to describe the dependence of risk
on high distribution moments and other risk characteristics. Thus, in general, mean-
variance preferences are not consistent with expect utility. The approach taken in
this paper is much more general, allowing for a variety of risk measures. Whether
a particular risk measure is consistent with expected utility depends on the actual
choice of the risk measure. For example, risk measures that are simple linear com-
binations of raw moments up to the kth degree can be represented by a kth degree
polynomial (Müller and Machina (1987)), generalizing the mean-variance result.
While in general the preferences defined in (6) cannot be supported by expected
utility, they are often consistent with expected utility locally. The idea is based
on Machina’s (1982) “Local Utility Function.” To facilitate this approach we first
restrict attention to risk measures that depend on the distribution of the random
variables only. Thus, we consider risk measures that are functions from the distri-
bution of realizations to the reals rather than functions from the random variables
themselves. Practically, this does not present a binding restriction since all the ex-
amples in this paper and all standard risk measures only rely on the distribution of
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realizations anyway. In this case the preferences in (6) can be written as
U () = V (E (Fey) ; R (Fey)) ;
where Fey is the cumulative distribution of the random variable   ey: When the
random variable of interest is clear, we will omit it from the notation and write the
utility as U (F ) = V (E (F ) ; R (F )) :
According to Machina (1982), if the realizations of all random variables are
contained in some bounded and closed interval I and U (F ) is Fréchet differentiable
with respect to the L1 norm,22 then for any two distributions F1; F2 on I there exists
u (;F1) differentiable almost everywhere on I such that
(A19)
U (F2)  U (F1) =
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF2 (y) 
Z
I
u (y;F1) dF1 (y) + o (kF2   F1k) ;
where kk denotes the L1 norm. That is, starting from a wealth distribution F1; if
an investor moves to another “close” distribution F2, then he compares the utility
from these two distributions as if he is maximizing his expected utility with a local
utility function u (;F1) :
The key to applying Machina’s result is to find sufficient conditions on the risk
measure which guarantee that U (F ) is Fréchet differentiable. This can be done in
many ways. Next we provide one simple but effective approach which is sufficient
to validate many popular risk measures as consistent with local expected utility.
Risk Measures as Functions of Moments
Let Fk =
R
ykdF (y) be the kth raw moment given distribution F; and mFk =R  
y   F1
k
dF (y) be the kth central moment given distribution F: Consider risk
measures which are a function of a finite number of (raw or central) moments. We
denote such risk measures by R
 
Fj1 ; :::; 
F
jl
;mFk1 ; :::;m
F
kn

. We assume that R is
differentiable in all arguments. The utility function in (6) then takes the form
(A20) U (F ) = V  F1 ; R  Fj1 ; :::; Fjl ;mFk1 ; :::;mFkn ;
22Fréchet differentiability is an infinite dimensional version of differentiability. The idea here is
that U (F ) changes smoothly with F; where changes in F are topologized using the L1 norm. See
Luenberger (1969, p. 171).
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where V is differentiable in both mean and risk. This class of utility functions is
quite general and it allows the risk measure to depend on a large number of high
distribution moments. We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If U (F ) takes the form (A20) then for any two distributions F1; F2
on I there exists u (;F1) differentiable almost everywhere on I such that (A19)
holds.
Proof: We need to show that U (F ) is Fréchet differentiable. By the chain rule for
Fréchet differentiability (Luenberger (1969, p. 176)), we know that if both Fk and
mFk are Fréchet differentiable for any k; then so is U () : The Fréchet differentia-
bility of Fk is obvious, since
F2k   F1k =
Z
I
ykdF2 (y) 
Z
I
ykdF1 (y) =  k
Z
I
(F2 (y)  F1 (y)) yk 1dy:
Now we show that mFk is Fréchet differentiable. We have
mFk =
Z  
y   F1
k
dF (y)
=
Z kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!y
i
 
F1
k i
dF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i Z
yidF (y)
=
kX
i=0
k!
i! (k   i)!
 
F1
k i
Fi ;
which is a differentiable function of the Fi ’s. By the chain rule, it follows immedi-
ately that mFk is also Fréchet differentiable. This completes the proof.
Sufficient Conditions for Positive Prices
Here we provide a sufficient condition for the positivity of equilibrium prices fol-
lowing the approach of Nielsen (1992). Let  2 Rn+1 be a bundle. Denote the
gradient of investor j’s utility function at  by rUj () = (U j0 () ; :::; U jn ()),
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where a subscript designates a partial derivative in the direction of the ith asset.
Also, let j () =    V j2 (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) =  V j1 (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) > 0
be the marginal rate of substitution of the expected payoff of the bundle for the risk
of the bundle. This is the slope of investor j’s indifference curve in the expected
payoff-risk space. For brevity we often omit the arguments of this expression and
use j () =  V j2 =V j1 :
Proposition 5 Assume that for each asset i there is some investor j such that
E(~yi) > 
j ()Ri (  ey) for all . Then, prices of all assets are positive in all
equilibria.
Proof: At an equilibrium, all investors’ gradients point in the direction of the price
vector. So the price of asset i must be positive in any equilibrium if there is some
investor j such that U ji () > 0 for all : Recall that
U j () = V j (E (  ey) ; R (  ey)) :
Thus,
U ji () = V
j
1 E(~yi) + V
j
2 Ri (  ey)
= V j1 [E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey)];
where Ri (  ey) denotes the partial derivative of R (  ey) with respect to  i:
Since V j1 > 0, U
j
i () > 0 corresponds to
E(~yi)  j ()Ri (  ey) > 0;
as required.
Note that j () can serve as a measure of risk aversion for investor j. We can
thus interpret this proposition as follows. If each asset’s expected return is suffi-
ciently high relative to some investor’s risk aversion and the marginal contribution
of the asset to total risk, then this asset will always be desirable by some investor,
and so, its price will be positive in any equilibrium.
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